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Abstract
Many factors are identified as causes of nuclear proliferation, but three stands out among them. These 
comprise the international and domestic political environment, technical capabilities and motivation. 
This article explores, on the one hand, the conditions that are conducive for the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons, whilst also suggesting strategies that can effectively address the problem. The authors 
use the South African episode as a case study. They identify the role of technology and motivations 
in the development of South Africa’s nuclear weapons programme and claim that the possession of 
technological capability is not a sufficient cause of nuclear proliferation. Rather, the presence of strong 
motivations in conjunction with sufficient technical capability leads to nuclear proliferation. 
Keywords: Nuclear proliferation; South Africa; technology; capability; motivation; incentives and 
disincentives; constraints; uranium; Nuclear Proliferation Treaty.
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aansporings en ontmoedigings; beperkings; uraan; Kernsperverdrag.
1. INTRODUCTION
Until now, large segments of the academic and policy communities have shared 
the consensus on technological capabilities as a cause of nuclear proliferation. 
Unfortunately, many seem to perceive nuclear weapons proliferation as almost 
entirely a technological problem. One of the main problems with the technical 
approach is the “technicist fallacy”; that is, its concept of proliferation primarily 
in terms of technological ability and solutions, rather than political incentives and 
disincentives.3 Stated somewhat differently, a technicist perspective regards the 
technological capability to manufacture nuclear weapons as a sufficient condition 
for proliferation. Technical capability can, in fact, be a necessary condition 
1 Mr Lucky Asuelime is a Lecturer and a PhD-candidate in International Relations, University of 
KwaZulu-Natal. E-mail: lucky4real14@gmail.com 
2 Dr Suzanne Francis is a Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science, University of 
KwaZulu-Natal. E-mail: franciss@ukzn.ac.za 
3 R Betts, “Paranoids, pygmies, pariahs, and non-proliferation”, Foreign Policy 26, Spring 1977, 
pp. 162-164.
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for nuclear proliferation but not a sufficient condition, since the decision to “go 
nuclear” is a complex military, economic and political question involving domestic 
as well as international considerations. 
While increasing numbers of states have advanced to nuclearization, there 
are a number of countries that have instead refrained from proliferation, despite 
their possession of the requisite technical and industrial capability (e.g., Canada, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Germany, Japan and Italy). For these countries, “the absence 
of operational nuclear weapons is (in fact, recognized as) more a function of 
political will than of technical knowhow”.4 An alternative perspective rooted in a 
consideration of the motivational aspects of nuclear proliferation can better answer 
the question of why states “go nuclear”.
In pursuing this argument, we discuss the drivers of South Africa’s nuclear 
weapons programme from being purely motivated by technological advancement 
rather than other motivations. After 1974, the apartheid government in South 
Africa decided to develop nuclear weapons as a deterrent, influenced by the coup 
in Portugal, and followed by the installation of pro-communist governments in 
Mozambique and Angola.5 Prior to 1974, the government only considered obtaining 
a nuclear capability as a matter of prestige for a strong Afrikaner nationalism6 – with 
it’s almost adequate technological “know how”7.  This outlook soon changed when 
the contagious “Cold War flu” and raging hostilities between the two world power 
blocs led by the United States of America (USA) and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR) found its way to the shores of Southern Africa, triggering a 
strategic need by the South African government to buffer her geo-political entity. 
The apartheid government concluded that the attainment of significant security, 
as well as the possession of bargaining power in international politics, could only 
4 WC Potter, Nuclear power and proliferation (Cambridge, Mass: Oeleschlager, 1982), p. 135.
5 W Stumpf , “Birth and death of the South African nuclear weapons programme”. Paper presented 
at the 50 years after Hiroshima Conference, Castiglioncello, Italy, 28 September to 2 October 
1995, <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/rsa/nuke/stumpf.htm>, accessed 31 January 2014; 
FW de Klerk, “Matters relating to nuclear non-proliferation treaty, violence, negotiation and 
the death penalty. Statement by the State President to a Joint Sitting of Parliament”, Hansard, 
24 March 1993, columns 3465-3478; JEC Hymans, “Taking the plunge: Emotion and identity in 
the decision to build nuclear weapons”. Paper presented to the annual meeting of the American 
Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 1-3 2000.
6 SM van Wyk,  “Sunset over atomic apartheid: United States-South African nuclear relations, 
1981-1993”, Cold War History 1(1-29), 2009; JEC Hymans, “Pride, prejudice, and plutonium: 
Explaining decisions to acquire nuclear weapons”, Ph.D.-dissertation, Harvard University, 2001; 
J Resende-Santos, “Anarchy and the emulation of military systems”, Security Studies 5(3), 1979, 
pp. 190-245.
7 Indeed, South Africa depended on possible collaboration from any and all of the Western States 
for the development of its nuclear capability. Such technological capability is a requisite for the 
development of nuclear weapons.
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be achieved through the acceleration of her nuclear weapons programme, with 
assistance from western allies.8
Using the South African case study, the aim in this article is to re-examine the 
potency inherent in the possession of nuclear weapons as a source of international 
political power; the role of the state and the domestic decision-making process 
in the areas of development and usage of technology in global politics; and, 
importantly, the extent to which motivations serve as a driving force towards 
nuclear proliferation beyond the traditional brief of the mere possession of 
technological capability.
2. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
In pursuing the question of why nations go nuclear, the motivational aspects of 
proliferation is useful as an analytical construct. Countries will consider the nuclear 
option for the following reasons – firstly, among other reasons is political power 
and prestige - to advance to the status of a global or regional power; to acquire 
positions within international forums; to enhance bargaining positions within an 
alliance, and to assert political and military independence. The earlier stages of 
the South African case study are suggestive of this rationale, but in the later stages 
deterrence became a key motivation for the development of nuclear armaments. 
The second reason why states go nuclear is military security - to deter attack from 
a nuclear-armed adversary and to redress conventional military asymmetry. This 
position highlights the relevance of deterrence theory.  Thirdly, states develop 
nuclear weapons because of economic considerations - to reduce the economic 
defense burden and to stimulate commerce through the growth of the nuclear 
industry, particularly the export of uranium yellowcake (U3O8), and others: to 
increase a country’s bargaining position in disarmament negotiations.9 This is also 
important in the South African case. Since it would not discontinue its apartheid 
policy, South Africa developed nuclear weapons as a diplomatic bargaining tool in 
its relations with both foes and allies on the international platform.10 The Office of 
Technology Assessment’s (OTA) 1977 lists of nuclear proliferation summarizes a 
variety of political incentives and disincentives for “going nuclear”:
8 D Albright, “South Africa and the affordable bomb”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 50(4), 
July-August 1994, pp. 37-47; J Siracusa, “Averting Armaggedon: In search of nuclear 
governance”, Globalisation and Development Center 22, 2008.
9 R Betts, “A diplomatic bomb for South Africa?” International Security 4(2), 1979, pp. 97-101.
10 Ibid.; L Beaton and J Maddox, The spread of nuclear weapons, (New York: Praeger, 1962); RN 
Rosecrance (ed.), The dispersion of nuclear weapons: Strategy and politics (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1964); CF Barnaby (ed.), Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons (London: 
Souvenir, 1969).
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“The general political incentives encompasses deterrence - The primary incentive for 
many states to acquire nuclear weapons would be to deter external efforts to undermine 
or destroy the existing regime or governmental system; Increased international status - 
Nuclear weapons can give self-confidence, and respect of neighbors and superpowers; 
Domestic political requirements - International status can serve to bolster a government’s 
domestic political standing; Economic considerations - Nuclear weapons programmes 
might provide technological spinoffs and expand internal economic interests; Increased 
strategic autonomy; Strategic hedge against military and political uncertainty; A weapon 
of last resort; As an instrument of the Third World, nuclear weapons might be equalizers; 
Peaceful nuclear explosives. 
The general political disincentives include Diversion of resources; Adverse public opinion; 
Disruption of assured security guarantees; Nuclear weapons might remove the proliferator 
from under the protective umbrella of a superpower; Infeasibility of a desired nuclear 
strategy - a modest nuclear force might not be sufficient to deter a nuclear enemy, and hence 
might invite a preemptive attack; Adverse international reaction; Adverse reactions by 
adversaries - This reaction could be diplomatic in the form of an arms race, or a preemptive 
attack; Advocacy of neutrality aims: Some neutralist leaders see the possession of nuclear 
weapons as eroding their credibility on arms control issues.”11
It is on this basis that one can both explain and use the South African case study as 
a point of analysis.
3. A HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA’S TECHNOLOGICAL 
CAPABILITY
The nuclear research programme in South Africa began in the late 1940s, 
established on the basis of the country’s abundant uranium reserves. With a focus 
upon the extraction of uranium ore for export, the Atomic Energy Board (AEB) 
was established in 1949. According to early predictions, South Africa has “as much 
as 25 percent of the noncommunist world’s total reserves”.12 In order to secure 
reliable sources of uranium, Britain and the USA invested in uranium-processing 
facilities in South Africa, which opened its first processing plant at Krugersdorp 
in 1952.13 A research and development programme began in 1957 at the Nuclear 
Physics Research Unit of the University of Witwatersrand. Both the USA and 
Britain contributed to South Africa’s early nuclear development. During the 1950s, 
Britain provided South Africa with the necessary information for the design and 
11 D Schroeer, Science, technology, and nuclear arms race (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1984), 
p. 339; USA Congress, Office of Technology Assessment. Nuclear proliferation and safeguards 
(Washington, D.C.: Office of Technology Assessment, 1977), pp. 94-98.
12 Betts, “A diplomatic bomb”.
13 DB Sole, “The South African nuclear case in the light of recent revelations”. Paper presented 
at the “New Horizons in Arms Control and Verification Conference”, John G Tower Center for 
Policy Studies, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas, 15 October 1993.
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development of research reactors and arranged visits of South African scientists and 
engineers to observe unclassified atomic energy work.14 
In 1957 South Africa and the United States signed a 20-year agreement under 
the “Atoms for Peace” programme. According to its terms, the USA agreed to 
supply South Africa with a light-water research reactor. The country’s first research 
reactor was called the South African Fundamental Atomic Research Installation 
1 (SAFARI-I), which began operating at Pelindaba in 1965 with a capacity of 20 
megawatts.15 The SAFARI-I reactor was placed under international safeguards 
based on a 1965 agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 
A full-scale nuclear programme seems to have begun in 1965, when Prime Minister 
Hendrik F Verwoerd implied that, “the South African government had a duty to 
consider the military uses of nuclear technology”.16 In 1967 South Africa began to 
indigenously design and construct a zero-energy research reactor, called Pelunduna 
Zero, located at the Atomic Energy Board (AEB) nuclear research center at 
Pelindaba. Because of financial constraints, however, its construction was cancelled 
in 1971. However, the early developments that occurred during the late 1950s and 
1960s - the processing of indigenous uranium ore, access to Western (British and 
American) nuclear technology, and the acquisition of a research reactor - enabled 
South Africa to progress toward achieving independent nuclear capability including 
the development of an indigenous enrichment capability.17
South Africa had meanwhile decided in 1974 to build two light-water power 
reactors with a combined output of 1 850 megawatts, at Koeberg, near Cape 
Town.18 In 1976 a French-based company, GDF Suez, signed a contract to build the 
Koeberg facility. The two reactors were placed under IAEA safeguards and became 
operational in 1984-1985. According to reports, South Africa has had a “small 
working model plant to reprocess the spent fuel from the Koeberg plants and the 
SAFARI reactor”.19 
14 M Reiss, Without the bomb: The politics of nuclear nonproliferation 1991 (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1988).
15 SM van Wyk, “Ally or critic? The United States’ response to South African nuclear development, 
1949-1980”, Cold War History 7(2), 2007, pp. 195-225; M Reiss, Without the bomb (South 
African Foreign Affairs Archives: SAFAA, 1981). Nuclear Energy, Top Secret, 1 January 1981-
6 May 1981, Memorandum, “South African–United States’ nuclear relations”, 20 March 1981; 
National Security Agency (NSA). CIAOSI, Scientific Intelligence Research Aid, Volume IV: Asia 
and Africa, “Nuclear activities of foreign nations,” 30 September 1956.
16 Betts, “South Africa”; JA Yaeger (ed.), Nonproliferation and U.S foreign policy( Washington, D. 
C: Brookings Institution, 1980), pp. 290-292.
17 RS Jaster, “South Africa”, in JC Snyder and SF Wells (eds), Limiting nuclear proliferation 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publication Co., 1985), pp. 149-150.
18 G Jones, South African proliferation prognosis and USA options (Los Angeles: Pan Heuristics, 
1977), pp. 8-10.
19 J Goldblat (ed.), Non-proliferation: The why and the wherefore (Philadelphia: Taylor and Francis, 
1985); IAEA Report, Board of Governors and the Director General to the General Conference, 
JOURNAL/JOERNAAL 39(1) June/Junie 2014
60
In sum, through cooperation in the nuclear field in this early period with 
anti-communist states, and through its own efforts to achieve indigenous nuclear 
capability over many years, South Africa developed uranium mining facilities 
(which produce more than ten per cent of the world’s total uranium production), 
a uranium enrichment plant at Valindaba, a light-water research reactor (SAFARI 
I), a research center at Pelindaba and two light-water power reactors (KOEBERG 
I and II) near Cape Town. While most of these facilities lack a direct impact on 
nuclear weapons in terms of specific components of production, it was assumed that 
the country could launch an independent nuclear weapons programme on the basis 
of having a pool of nuclear technicians with the know-how and experience as well 
as these nuclear facilities. In addition, by refusing to sign the 1968 Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and to open its Valindaba enrichment 
facility to the IAEA, South Africa kept its nuclear options open. 
The concern over proliferation was heightened in August 1977, when both 
the Soviet and the US Intelligence satellites detected an apparent nuclear weapons 
test site in the Kalahari Desert.20 Right after the Kalahari test site, Vastrap, was 
discovered, it was assumed that, “South Africa had obtained weapons-usable 
highly enriched uranium from a pilot-scale uranium enrichment plant at Valindaba, 
which began operating in 1975”.21 This information spurred widespread fears 
of an imminent South African nuclear weapons test. After a strong diplomatic 
intervention by the USA, France, West Germany and Britain, however, the South 
African government pledged to dismantle the test site and not to build nuclear 
arms.22 International anxiety and suspicion over South Africa’s nuclear capability 
and intentions were further aroused with a second testing controversy in September 
1979, when a US satellite, Vela, had sighted two bright pulses of light in the South 
Atlantic, the sequence and timing of which closely resembled the signature of a 
nuclear weapons detonation.23 After an intense search by the United States and 
several other countries, no other relatively acceptable evidence of a nuclear test was 
uncovered24 despite the fact that the Arecibo radio telescope detected an ionospheric 
electromagnetic impulse; US acoustic detectors picked up the shock wave from the 
blast and radioactive fallout blown by the hemispheric winds was detected in New 
Zealand sheep thyroids.
South Africa’s Nuclear Capabilities, GC 28(724), 24 September 1984, Annex 1, Attachment 3.
20 M Marder and D Oberdorfer, “How West, Soviets moved to head off S. Africa A-test”, 
Washington Post, 28 August 1977.
21 LS Spector, Nuclear proliferation today (New York: Vintage Books, 1984), p. 221.
22 Marder and Oberdorfer.
23 New York Times, 26 October 1979.
24 LA Dunn, Controlling the bomb: Nuclear proliferation in the 1980s (New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 1982), p. 54.
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In a 1976 interview concerning South Africa’s defence posture, Prime Minister 
John Vorster mentioned, “we are only interested in the peaceful applications of 
nuclear power. But we can enrich uranium, and we have the capability. And we did 
not sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty.”25 Dr Louw Alberts, Vice President of 
AEB, stated in 1974 that, “our technology and science have advanced sufficiently 
for us to produce (a nuclear bomb) if we have to”.26 
Renfrew Christie’s study of electricity consumption by the uranium 
enrichment plants proves that South Africa had not enriched sufficient uranium to 
make any A-bombs before the 1980s. The 1979 A-bomb test could only have been 
an Israeli A-bomb (probably of the neutron bomb variety intended for anti-tank 
battlefields), tested by, or in cooperation with, the South African navy. This would 
also imply that the 1977 A-bomb test site was either intended for an Israeli bomb 
test, or was a dummy site put up as a bargaining chip – though it is not clear that P 
W Botha’s government gained any concessions in exchange.27
Definitive evidence of South Africa’s weapons capability was provided by 
an official announcement in April 1981. South Africa had produced 45 per cent 
enriched uranium to fuel the SAFARI-I research reactor. Since, “it is relatively 
easy to improve 45 per cent enriched uranium to the 90 percent level needed for 
weapons”,28 many have agreed that South Africa has had the capability to produce 
nuclear weapons since 1981. South Africa completed its first bomber- deliverable 
weapon in 1982. However, further refinements in terms of reliability, safety, as well 
as delivery designs delayed the completion of the next nuclear weapon for another 
five years (August 1987). Production then accelerated afterwards to the extent that 
its nuclear bomb stockpile finally stood at six and a half in 1989.29
In any event, it is clear today that there was no significant technological 
obstacle to South Africa’s production of a nuclear bomb, apart from UN sanctions 
and embargoes. All the technical and circumstantial evidence, taken together, 
suggests that South Africa undoubtedly has the capability to design, produce and 
test a small nuclear weapon. Thus, the risk of proliferation in South Africa was not 
heightened because of technological capability alone.
25 Newsweek, 17 May 1976.
26 Rand Daily Mail, 11 July 1974.
27 C Renfrew, Electricity, industry and class in South Africa (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1984).
28 Spector, p. 222.
29 D Albright, South Africa’s secret nuclear weapons. Institute for Science and International 
Security (ISIS) Report, May 1994; FW de Klerk, “Matters relating to nuclear non-proliferation 
treaty”; JW De Villiers, R Jardine & M Reiss, “Why South Africa gave up the bomb”, Foreign 
Affairs 72(6), 1993, pp. 98-109.
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4. SOUTH AFRICA’S MOTIVATIONS: INCENTIVES AND 
CONSTRAINTS
The nuclear weapons programme in South Africa progressed with various 
motivations, reflecting a changing military and political situation both domestically 
and internationally.30 An economic justification for advancing a nuclear energy 
programme is considerable but it does not seem entirely consistent.31 Although the 
country lacks oil resources it has massive coal and solar resources. The combination 
of uranium and coal resources can supply a sufficient amount of energy to meet the 
country’s energy needs. Accordingly, their reason for maintaining a nuclear power 
programme is political and not economic in this regard.32 
In fact, the economic rationale for the peaceful application of nuclear energy 
has been intertwined with military weapons options since the early 1960s. The 
military security incentive appears to be one of the major factors to control South 
Africa’s decision to build the nuclear bomb. Since the early 1960s South Africa has 
experienced a series of setbacks in world affairs.33 In June 1963, the Organization 
of African Unity (OAU) was formed with one of its expressed goals to achieve 
independence for those countries still under minority rule. During the same year, 
in condemning South Africa’s apartheid policy, the United Nations (UN) decided 
to impose a voluntary arms embargo on South Africa. Meanwhile, South African 
officials first began to discuss nuclear weaponry. In 1965 Prime Minister Hendrik 
Verwoerd stated that, “the South African government had a ‘duty’ to consider 
the military uses of nuclear technology”.34 In 1968, General HJ Martin, Chief of 
Staff of the South African army, also noted that, “South Africa was prepared to 
manufacture nuclear weapons”.35 Although South Africa considered manufacturing 
nuclear weapons in the 1960s, the country did not yet initiate a full-scale nuclear 
weapons programme. 
During the 1970s, a number of developments both inside and outside South 
Africa stimulated the development of a nuclear weapons capability. During 
this period the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique gained their 
30 WJ Long and SR Grillot, “Ideas, beliefs, and nuclear policies: The cases of South Africa and 
Ukraine”, Nonproliferation Review 7(1), 2000, pp. 24–40; TV Paul, Power versus prudence: Why 
nations forgo nuclear weapons (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2000); BA Thayer, 
“The causes of nuclear proliferation and the utility of the nuclear nonproliferation regime”, 
Security Studies 4(3), 1995, pp. 494–495.
31 P Liberman, “The rise and fall of the South African bomb”, International Security 26(2), 2001, 
pp. 45-86.
32 Atomic Energy Board (AEB). Report on the investigation into the possible introduction of 
nuclear power in the Republic of South Africa (Pelindaba: AEB, 1968).
33 Liberman, “The rise and fall of the South African bomb”, pp. 45-86.
34 Betts, “South Africa”, pp. 290-292.
35 Ibid.
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independence and joined the African frontline states. Cuban troops and Soviet 
military advisers were injected into the region. In 1974 there was a move to 
expel South Africa from the UN, a move blocked only by the vetoes of the USA, 
Britain and France. The Security Council passed a resolution in 1976 to exercise 
a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa. The erosion of support from the 
Western allies with the growing international condemnation of apartheid, and the 
fear of possible aggression from neighbouring states, contributed to South Africa’s 
growing isolation in international affairs and its deteriorating security situation. 
Moreover, anti-government protest within the country seriously intensified, 
following the Soweto Massacre. All these factors presumably contributed to prompt 
South Africa to pursue a nuclear weapons option. It was during the 1970s that 
the South African government initiated a number of efforts especially aimed at 
acquiring a nuclear capability. 
In the 1980s, the military and political situation both inside and outside South 
Africa deteriorated further. Domestically, anti-apartheid resistance and government 
repression intensified from the mid-1980s. The creation of the United Democratic 
Front (UDF) and the National Forum – umbrella organisations for a multiplicity 
of ideologies and organisations united in their opposition to apartheid – saw the 
intensification of protest towards the apartheid state. In addition, sabotage attacks 
waged against the South African government by the African National Congress 
(ANC) became bolder. International opposition to apartheid also became more 
widespread and more effective. The creation of the Southern African Development 
Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) as resistance by the Frontline States, and the 
calling for international sanctions by the Non-Aligned Movement and OAU had 
an impact. Since 1985, more than 100 foreign companies withdrew from South 
Africa, and all governments within the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) imposed sanctions.36 Besides economic isolation, South 
Africa experienced growing political isolation and a loss of diplomatic relations 
with several states.37 President PW Botha stated: “South Africa is now facing a 
challenge from the capitalist West as much as from the communist East.”38 The 
combination of this “total onslaught” appeared to affect South Africa’s nuclear 
weapons option.39
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 At the end of the 1980s however, there were dramatic political changes in South Africa. In 
1990 the new President Frederik W de Klerk made a firm commitment to remove a number of 
apartheid measures. The new administration undertook a number of anti-apartheid actions - to 
release political prisoners, assist with the return of exiles, indemnify political activists for past 
crimes and review security legislation. With all these political changes there were growing 
optimism that sanctions against the country may soon be lifted. Particularly, President De 
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With growing violence internally and towards the region of Southern 
Africa, the gradual decline of South Africa’s regional hegemony, and increasing 
international isolation, South African leaders considered themselves to be “under a 
state of siege”.40  For years, South African leaders increasingly felt a sense of threat 
to their survival, and they adopted the concept of the “total onslaught” allegedly 
being waged against South Africa.41 In 1981 South African defense minister, 
General Magnus Malan, described the situation of a “total onslaught” as follows: 
“An ideologically motivated struggle and the aim is the implacable and unconditional 
imposition of the aggressor’s will on the target state. South Africa is today involved in 
total war. The war is not only an area for the soldier. Everyone is involved and has a role 
to play.”42
From the sense of an all-out threat to its survival, South African leaders may 
well have considered all possible means, including the nuclear weapons option, 
to compensate for its own vulnerabilities and to counter the strengths of its 
adversaries.43 In fact, South Africa perceived a serious threat to its security, due 
to possible conventional attack from neighbouring black African states and the 
presence of the Soviet and Cuban military in Angola. In preparing for this security 
threat, the South African leadership would anticipate deterrent effects from the 
possession of nuclear weapons.44 For South African leaders, the overt deployment 
of nuclear weapons also might be thought “to provide added insurance against 
the South African government’s fears of a large-scale, externally supported 
conventional attack”.45 To sum up, military security considerations due to the 
sense of all-out threat to the survival of the apartheid state appeared to be one of 
the important factors to motivate the South African efforts to acquire a nuclear 
weapons capability. 
Klerk’s initiatives to revoke apartheid legislation - the statutes mandating where people may live 
according to racial classification, restricting black ownership of land and classifying citizens by 
race at birth – encouraged the European community, the United States and the IMF to consider 
easing economic and financial sanctions. All these political developments appear to considerably 
reduce South Africa’s isolation; Time, 11 February 1991; F Slabbert, “South Africa and the world 
in the nineties”, South Africa International 21(1), July 1990, pp. 20-26; PH Baker, “South Africa 
on the move”, Current History 89(547), 1990, pp. 197-200.
40 WC Potter & G Mukhatzhanova (eds), Forecasting nuclear proliferation in the 21st Century. A 
comparative perspective, Volume 2 (Stanford: Stanford Security Studies, 2010); Jaster, “South 
Africa”, p. 157.
41 Jaster, p. 157.
42 S Geldenhuys, Some foreign policy implications of South Africa’s “Total National Strategy” 
(Braamfontein: South African Institute of International Affairs, 1981), p. 3. 
43 To combat the perceived “total onslaught”, the apartheid state devised a “total strategy” that may 
include nuclear weapons.
44 LA Dunn and WH Overholt, “The next phase in nuclear proliferation research”, Orbis 20(2), 
1976, pp. 497-524.
45 Ibid.
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While military security considerations constituted an important incentive, many 
have suggested that the primary motive of South Africa’s nuclear weapons option 
was political.46 The thinking of South African leaders was to use a nuclear arsenal 
for non-military purposes such as improving its bargaining position vis-à-vis other 
African states, and increasing its diplomatic leverage vis-à-vis Western countries.47 
In demonstrating their nuclear weapons capability, South Africa would remind 
neighbouring African states of their own scientific and technical underdevelopment 
and their inability to counter it, thus enabling South Africa to have a favourable 
bargaining position in any future political negotiations with its neighbouring black 
states. South Africa’s nuclear weapons option could be used to extract nuclear 
concessions from the West, particularly Britain and the USA. For example, it has 
been observed that the objective of the Kalahari nuclear test preparations served 
as a bargaining chip to win important concessions from the proliferation-sensitive 
Carter administration.48 By threatening to employ nuclear weapons or by promising 
to refrain from their use, South Africa attempted to secure her various political, 
economic, or security interests in political bargaining with the West. In sum, the 
South African leadership hoped that the open acquisition of nuclear weapons 
would enhance South Africa’s position in the world and open the way for future 
negotiations with the West and with its neighbouring countries on issues of mutual 
interest. 
While there were various incentives to develop nuclear weapons, South 
Africa would refrain from the open demonstration of its nuclear capability due to a 
number of constraints.49 At first, as many nuclear strategists suggested, the military 
utility of nuclear weapons has in fact been doubtful, either as a deterrent or as a 
defense.50 Although its margin of military superiority has somewhat declined in 
the region, South Africa maintained its conventional superiority over any political 
opponents in Africa. Compared to the combined military power of all the nearby 
states, South Africa’s conventional military power was continuously overwhelming. 
Mainly because of South Africa’s geographic position, and the economic and 
military weakness of black African states, “there was realistically no conventional 
threat that South Africa could not handle easily”.51 In short, as long as South Africa 
46 Some, for example Flournoy and Campbell, have emphasized the military intention of South 
Africa’s nuclear option, but many have generally suggested that South African attempts to 
possess nuclear weapons is for non-military purposes such as enhancing the country’s status or 
increasing its diplomatic leverage. 
47 Betts, “A diplomatic bomb”.
48 Jaster, “South Africa”.
49 N Tannenwald, “Stigmatizing the bomb. Origins of the nuclear taboo”, International Security 
29(4), 1995, pp. 5-49; N Tannenwald, The nuclear taboo. The United States and the non-use of 
nuclear weapons since 1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
50 JS Spence, “South Africa: The nuclear option”, African Affairs 80(321), 1980, pp. 445-446.
51 Betts, “Paranoids, pygmies, piriahs”, pp. 162-164.
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maintained overwhelmingly strong conventional capabilities in the region, nuclear 
weapons would be unnecessary for either deterrence or for defense. In effect, doubt 
about South Africa’s military utility would downplay the incentive of her leaders to 
openly demonstrate her weapons capability. 
South Africa experienced strong international pressures against the two 
attempts to conduct underground and atmospheric nuclear weapons tests in 1977 
and 1979.52 The South African leadership might have realized that any use (or 
threatened use) of nuclear weapons by South Africa against an African state could 
well provoke a collective international reaction. In addition to diplomatic sanctions 
it might, more importantly, provoke strong economic retaliation from the Western 
countries, particularly from the USA. In political terms, nuclear weapons might 
be counterproductive to South Africa’s foreign policies and interests in Africa by 
further alienating other African states and by jeopardizing military, political and 
economic relations with the West. In the South African case at the time, it appears 
that the incentives were negligible and the constraints substantial.
Broadly speaking therefore, a country’s incentives are divided into military 
security considerations, political objectives, economic spillover and domestic 
politics. In general, deterrence, strategic autonomy, and considerations over 
political bargaining appear as the most important incentive factors of nuclear 
proliferation in South Africa. Depending on a country’s particular domestic and 
international situation, however, the focus, priorities, and emphasis concerning 
nuclear weapons options vary. For instance, for South Africa political bargaining 
considerations appear to be the primary motive for nuclear proliferation. 
Both FW de Klerk and PW Botha have been quoted several times as claiming 
that the A-bombs were never integrated with army strategy, nor ever deployed, nor 
were there any military exercises practicing their use. PW Botha’s sole strategy 
was, in the event of a conventional military invasion of South Africa or Namibia, 
to warn the NATO powers that South Africa had A-bombs. If that did not ensure 
that the NATO powers intervened to prevent an invasion, he would then detonate 
52 Recent research suggest inconclusively that the 1979 incident is not related to South Africa. 
When Gen. Constand Viljoen (an Afrikaner pillar of the apartheid regime who commanded South 
Africa’s ground forces from 1976 to 1980 and then was chief of general staff for five years) was 
asked about this, he said: “We wanted to get nuclear know-how from anywhere we could and 
from Israel, too.” Viljoen said: “That is what was decided, and that is how we acted.” Viljoen 
evaded a question about the 1979 test; Cf. Y Melman 2009, “Did Israel play a role in 1979: 
South Africa nuclear test? South Africa turned to Israel after West froze nuclear ties in 1976 over 
development of military program”, HAARETZ 2 August 2009 [online], <http://www.haaretz. 
com/print-edition/features/did-israel-play-a-role-in-1979-south-africa-nuclear-test-1.281226>, 
accessed 3 February 2014.
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one A-bomb in an above-ground test to prove South Africa’s possession of nuclear 
weapons. But that was all that was strategized.53
Military security considerations did not seem to be the primary incentive of 
South Africa’s nuclear program. Over time South Africa changed her incentives to 
acquire nuclear technology. While military security considerations constitute an 
important incentive, the primary motive of South Africa’s nuclear weapons option 
seems to be political considerations, such as improving its bargaining position vis-
à-vis other African states, increasing its diplomatic leverage vis-à-vis the Western 
countries, and enhancing the country’s political status in the world. In short, South 
African foreign policy considerations appear the primary incentive for achieving 
nuclear weapons status, rather than military security considerations. 
As countries have different proliferation incentives, so they show varying 
degrees of problems and constraints in pursuing nuclear weapons options. A 
country’s constraints are broadly divided into military security, international 
political constraints, and domestic politics. In terms of constraints, possible military 
reaction by other states appeared to be one of the most important constraints for 
South Africa. With a conventional military strength superior to that of neighbouring 
states, military reactions by other states appear to be only modest constraints in 
pursuing her nuclear weapons options. Another important constraint would be 
the strategic credibility gap which comprises scepticism about the strategic utility 
of nuclear weapons. For example, the overt possession of nuclear bombs would 
cancel security guarantees from her supporting countries. As a result, the country’s 
security would be more in danger with a nuclear bomb than without one.
5. CONCLUSION
Indeed, some weaknesses in the South African security situation may have led 
some observers to conclude that domestic politics drove South African nuclear 
weapons policies. The “general domestic explanation for nuclear proliferation, 
derived from organizational politics theory, is that influential science, energy, and 
armament complexes spur nuclear acquisition”.54 Technology is, of course, one 
of two necessary conditions for the nuclear proliferation process. However, the 
fundamental conditions of nuclear proliferation appear to be motivational factors. 
A lesson from the South African case buttresses the tremendous growth and spread 
of civil nuclear technology, because once countries have a relative level of nuclear 
capability, technical constraints will continue to decline as an obstacle to making 
a nuclear bomb and, in turn, various motivations propel such states to cross the 
53 AJ Venter and NP Badenhorst, How South Africa built six atom bombs and then abandoned its 
nuclear weapons program (Michigan: Ashanti, 2008).
54 Liberman. “The rise and fall”.
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nuclear threshold. Once a country has decided to develop nuclear weapons because 
of certain motivational situations, it will have devoted all its scarce resources to 
that objective. 
In fact General Constand Viljoen, when head of the South African Defence 
Force (SADF), strongly argued in vain that A-bombs were both militarily useless, 
and would consume a huge proportion of the military budget that was, instead, 
urgently needed to begin the manufacturing of jet engines for fighter aircraft, and 
other weapons. Viljoen, who visited Israel and conferred with senior officers, said: 
“Instead of the billions we spent on nuclear weapons, we could have bought tanks and 
needed military equipment. Ambitious politicians and the heads of the Armscor arms 
corporation [where the nuclear weapons were developed] pushed for the program. As a 
good soldier I was compelled to obey them.”55
Deducing from this, the authors conclude that if a country has strong motivations 
(taken in conjunction with adequate technical ability), it can produce a nuclear 
capability and bombs. In short, “going nuclear” is not a matter of technological 
capability alone, but also of ideological motivation. 
55 Melman.
